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SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION OVER CLAIMS IN
INTERVENTION
MARILYN J. IRELAND*

I. INTRODUCTION
Recent legislation, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, supersedes existing case law
governing supplemental' jurisdiction over claims in intervention. 2 Except
in 28 U.S.C. § 1332 diversity cases, section 1367 provides for supplemental
jurisdiction over additional claims that "form part of the same case
' 3 or
controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.
The term supplemental jurisdiction is a creation of section 1367. It
replaces and expands upon the judicially created doctrines of ancillary
and pendent jurisdiction. Through supplemental jurisdiction, a federal
court can hear claims that do not have any independent basis of federal
subject matter jurisdiction. When there is federal subject matter jurisdiction over the main claim, the federal court may exercise jurisdiction
over additional "ancillary" or "pendant" claims that are "supplementary" to the main claim. In keeping with the statute, the term "supplementary jurisdiction" will be used throughout this article, even though
the reference is to law which predates the statute.
Under section 1367(a), related claims by and against an intervening
party will no longer need an independent basis of federal subject matter
jurisdiction. 4 There are two important exceptions to this general rule.
First, section 1367(b) contains additional restrictions for section 1332
diversity cases.' The precise application of this subsection is still somewhat
unclear. Its effect is to invite the federal courts to reconcile the complete
diversity requirement of Strawbridge v. Curtiss6 with the doctrine of
supplemental jurisdiction. Second, section 1367(c) permits federal district
courts to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction because of considerations of economy and fairness, 7 such as the existence of novel or
* Professor of Law, California Western School of Law; J.D., University of Chicago; B.A.,
Miami University, Ohio. The author wishes to acknowledge the efforts of her research assistants,
John Rich and Andrew Zucker.
i. The term "supplemental" jurisdiction replaces and includes what was previously called
"ancillary," "pendent," and "pendent-party" jurisdiction.
2. Strictly speaking, intervention is a means for joinder of parties. Problems of subject matter
jurisdiction relate to joined claims, not to joined parties. The addition of a new party, however,
creates the potential for new claims by and against that party. It is these additional "claims in
intervention" that produce the need for supplemental or some other form of federal subject matter
jurisdiction.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1992).
4. Id.
5. Id. § 1367(b).
6. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
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complex state law issues,' the predominance of the supposedly supplemental claim over the main claim, 9 the dismissal of the main claim, 10
or other exceptional circumstances."
In diversity cases, the question of supplemental jurisdiction over additional claims is closely related to the question of continuing jurisdiction2
over existing claims when- an additional party is added to the lawsuit.
In one such case, Phelps v. Oaks, 3 the Supreme Court upheld subject
matter jurisdiction even after a non-diverse party intervened. Eventually,
a restrictive gloss on this case resulted in many lower courts demanding
a higher level of relationship for supplemental jurisdiction over claims
in intervention than would be required in other types of joinder. If a
rationalizing principle governing 4supplemental jurisdiction existed, the
commentators could not find it.1
In section 1367, Congress has provided that unifying principle, a
generous and expansive recognition of supplemental jurisdiction whenever
constitutionally permissible, except as limited in diversity cases by the
requirement of complete diversity. 5 After a brief introduction to supplemental jurisdiction and to intervention, this article will discuss section
1367 as it applies to claims in intervention, in both non-diversity and
diversity cases. It will then explore the effect of the particular limitations
of section 1367(b) on plaintiffs' claims in intervention, with special
emphasis on the problems of alignment in multi-polar disputes. In interpleader cases and in other cases in which the intervenor cannot be
aligned as sharing an interest with any existing party, the author suggests
that supplemental jurisdiction should exist under subsection (b). Finally,
the article reviews pre-statutory law, demonstrating the changes effected
by the new statute.
II.

SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION GENERALLY

As joinder liberalized, so did the need to expand the view of what
constituted a single "case or controversy" under Article III of the United
States Constitution.' 6 For example, a plaintiff must bring a patent infringement case to federal court, but the same plaintiff might also have
other claims against the same defendant. A related state unfair competition claim would not need to have an independent basis of federal

8. Id. § 1367(c)(1).
9. Id. § 1367(c)(2).
10. Id. § 1367(c)(3).
11. Id. § 1367(c)(4).
12. 117 U.S. 236 (1886); see Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n of Kansas,
260 U.S. 48 (1922).
13. 117 U.S. 236 (1886).
14. CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 31 (4th ed. 1983).
15. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
16. See 13 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3523 (1984)
(supplemental jurisdiction is "a common sense answer to the problems of piecemeal litigation that
otherwise would arise by virtue of the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts prescribed by Article
III and the complexity of many modern lawsuits").
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subject matter jurisdiction if it is joined to the patent infringement
claim. 7 Without supplemental jurisdiction, federal courts would often
have to proceed piecemeal, resolving only the federal part of a complex
lawsuit.
In comparison, plaintiff might wish to join a totally unrelated claim
to a pre-existing federal claim. If, by chance, the defendant had driven
into plaintiff's parked car, this additional claim would not be related
to an act of patent infringement committed by the same defendant. It
would therefore not be supplemental and could only be brought in
federal court if supported by independent subject matter jurisdiction.
Because unrelated claims can be efficiently brought in a different forum,
there is no need for supplemental jurisdiction in such cases, nor could
it be argued that it is all one Article III case, the test established by
Congress in subsection 1367(a).
The Supreme Court established the constitutional test of supplemental
5 There, the
jurisdiction in United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs."
Court held that judicial power under Article III extends to all claims
that "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact."' 9 The main
claim and the supplemental claim must be so related that the plaintiff
"would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding." 20
That case was properly pending in federal court under section 133121
because the plaintiff had alleged a secondary boycott in violation of the
Federal Labor Relations Act. The plaintiff, however, eventually prevailed
only under state common law, not federal law. Nonetheless, the Gibbs
Court upheld supplemental jurisdiction over the state claim. The underlying controversy arose because the defendant boycotted the plaintiff's
business as a result of a labor dispute. These facts were the common
element of both the federal and the state claims. Therefore, the federal
court had the power to entertain the entire case.
[Supplemental] jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power exists
whenever the relationship between the [federal] claim and the state
claims permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court
comprises but one constitutional 'case.' . . . The state and federal
claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact such
that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial

proceeding ....22
17. Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933). Section 1367 was not the first attempt by Congress
to codify supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) ("The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action asserting a claim of unfair competition when joined with a substantial
and related claim under the copyright patent, plant variety protection or trade-mark laws.").
18. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
19. Id. at 725.
20. Id. In Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 371 (1978), the Supreme
Court recognized that Gibbs established the constitutional limits of federal judicial power. It declined
to reiterate, however, the common nucleus of operative facts test. Id. at 371 n.10.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. "The district court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Id.
22. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.
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Supplemental jurisdiction can also exist when a defendant counterclaims
24
against a plaintiff, 23 or cross claims against a co-defendant.
In contrast, the plaintiff may not assert a supplemental claim in a
section 1332 diversity case. In Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v.
Kroger,25 the Supreme Court refused to permit the plaintiff to file a
claim against a party whom the defendant had impled. The defendant's
claim against the impled party was for indemnification; thus, it was
factually related. The plaintiff's claim was essentially the same as the
defendant's, an assertion that the impled party was ultimately liable.
The Court held that, unlike the defendant, the plaintiff in a diversity
case could not rely on supplemental jurisdiction.
In diversity cases, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires complete diversity. In
Strawbridge v. Curtiss,26 the Supreme Court held that each plaintiff must
be diverse from each defendant. This holding, according to Kroger, is
that a plaintiff cannot use supplemental jurisdiction
tantamount to saying
27
in a diversity case.
A similar problem arises when a plaintiff wishes to add an additional
party to a supplemental claim in a non-diversity case. In such a case,
Strawbridge, Kroger, and other interpretations of section 1332 do not
govern. 28 In Finley v. United States,29 the Supreme Court refused to
extend supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff's claim against an additional party, even in a non-diversity case where the original jurisdiction
was exclusively federal due to the Federal Tort Claims Act. 0 The Court
recognized, without deciding, that the constitutional relationship test
appeared to be met, but concluded on policy grounds that the additional
claim would not be entitled to supplemental jurisdiction.3'
The reaction to Finley by Congress was relatively swift. Congress
adopted section 1367 with the express purpose of overruling the Supreme
Court's grudging approach to supplemental jurisdiction in Finley.3 2 The
effect of the rule in Finley was to extend Strawbridge beyond the confines

23. Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593 (1926); see also Horton v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348 (1961).
24. L.A.S.A. Per L'Industrial Del Marmo Society Per Azioni v. Alexander, 414 F.2d 143 (6th
Cir. 1969); Scott v. Fancher, 369 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1966); R. M. Smythe & Co. v. Chase Nat'l
Bank, 291 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1961); Glen Falls Indem. Co. v. United States ex rel. Westinghouse
Elec. Supply Co., 229 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1956). Because 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) applies only to 28
U.S.C. § 1332 cases, there is no reason in non-diversity cases to deny supplemental jurisdiction over
plaintiffs' cross-claims or any other related plaintiffs' claimas.
25. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
26. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
27. This holding is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b), if the effect is contrary to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
28. The Supreme Court first distinguished pendent party from pendent jurisdiction in the case
of Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976). In Aldinger, the Supreme Court concluded that "it is
to litigate in addition to their federal claim
one thing to authorize two parties, already present ....
their state-law claim over which there is no independent basis of federal jurisdiction. But it is quite
another thing to permit a plaintiff . . . to join an entirely different defendant." Id. at 22.
29. 490 U.S. 545 (1980).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).

31. Richard D. Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity: Life After Finley and
the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L. J. 445 (1991).
32. Id. at 469-71.
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of the diversity statute which it interprets. Section 1367 rejects this
approach by providing for a constitutional rather than a policy test of
supplemental jurisdiction in most cases.
Article III of the Constitution permits supplemental jurisdiction even
in diversity cases and even respecting plaintiffs' claims." The Supreme
Court in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire34 held that there
is no constitutional impediment to supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims. At issue in Tashire was the constitutionality of another
diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1335. This statute expressly provided for
federal diversity jurisdiction in statutory interpleader cases, even though
only minimal jurisdiction existed. 3" Congress had created the remedy of
statutory interpleader in order to provide a forum for a kind of multipolar dispute in which various adverse claimants are all vying for the
same thing. Section 1335 diversity jurisdiction, unlimited by Strawbridge,
exists if there are two or more adverse claimants to a single fund, thing,
or duty and they are diverse.3 6 Unless the Supreme Court is now willing
to overrule Tashire to create such a constitutional impediment and,
in
further, to apply the rule in nondiversity as well as diversity cases,
37
enacting section 1367, Congress has effectively overruled Finley.
Except in section 1332 diversity cases, Article III alone limits supplemental jurisdiction.3" In order to avoid overruling both Strawbridge
and Kroger, subsection (b) of section 1367 provides a narrower rule in
diversity cases. Subsection (b) strictly limits supplemental jurisdiction
over plaintiffs' claims. It forbids supplemental jurisdiction over claims

33. Id. at 471.
34. 386 U.S. 523 (1967).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1335.
36. Id.
37. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967) marks the high water line
of the expansion of federal subject matter jurisdiction by the Supreme Court. Since then, its decisions
have shown a great reluctance to grant supplemental jurisdiction. See Finley v. United States, 490
U.S. 545 (1980); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
In Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969), the Supreme Court began the process of retreat from
an expansive approach to federal subject matter jurisdiction by denying aggregation of claims by
several class action members. Even when the named party had met the amount in controversy
required for diversity jurisdiction, the Court denied what amounted to supplemental jurisdiction
over lesser class member claims. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 302 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (1973).
If the last two decades of judicial "conservatism" is merely deference to the authority of Congress,
the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 should reverse the trend. If, instead, the Court's true agenda
is to decrease the caseload of the federal courts through a restrictive approach to jurisdiction, its
primary remaining tool will be its power to narrow the holding in United Mine Workers of America
v. Gibbs. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). throuah constitutional interoretation.
Although 28 U.S.C. § 1367 makes no mention of class actions, there has been some suggestion
that it could be read to change the Zahn rule. RiCHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVI PROCEDURE 120
(Supp. 1991); see also Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Grasping at Burnt Straws: The
Disaster of the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 963, 981 (1991). If there is such
an effect, it will not be due to the intent of the drafters. See Thomas M. Mengler et al., Congress
Accepts the Supreme Court's Invitation to Codify Supplemental Jurisdiction, 74 JUDICATURE 213
(Dec.-Jan. 1991).
38. See Rosen v. Chang, 758 F. Supp. 799 (D.R.I. 1991); 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Note, however,
that the court has some discretion to decline to exercise its jurisdiction under subsection (c). 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c).
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by plaintiffs against intervenors, and by intervening plaintiffs, if the
effect "would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of

section 1332."

9

The obvious concern of Congress was that the complete

diversity rule of Strawbridge be maintained.
The statute leaves it to the courts to determine how the boundary
between supplemental jurisdiction and the complete diversity rule will
be defined. What subsection (b) makes clear is that under section 1332,
only the plaintiffs' claims need to meet the complete diversity rule.
Congress has foreclosed the courts from extending Strawbridge to claims
by parties who are not plaintiffs, while leaving the courts free to limit
further the complete diversity rule as applied to plaintiffs.
III.

INTERVENTION GENERALLY

Intervention is one way that additional claims may come into a lawsuitA0
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) grants non-parties the right to
join a lawsuit if they claim an interest in the subject of the lawsuit
such that, as a practical matter, resolution of the dispute between the
original parties could affect the interest of the intervenor. 4' This is a
fairly stringent joinder test, closely approximating the wording of compulsory joinder under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19.42

Even if the intervenor does not meet the requirements of rule 24(a),

the court may allow intervention under rule 24(b). 43 Rule 24(b) requires

39. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).
40. Intervenors voluntarily join the lawsuit. Outsiders may also be brought in by the defendant.
FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
41. Rule 24(a) also provides for intervention of right whenever a statute of the United States
grants the intervenor an unconditional right to intervene.
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to
intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to
the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is
so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or
impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest
is adequately represented by existing parties.
FED. R. Crv. P. 24(a).
42. Rule 19 is closely parallel to rule 24. Rule 24, however, adds an additional requirement of
non-representation. Therefore, in general, a person can intervene of right under rule 24(a)(2) only
if the person should have been joined in the first place. See New York State Ass'n for Retarded
Children, Inc. v. Carey, 438 F. Supp. 440 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
43. Rule 24(b) provides:
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to
intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers a conditional
right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action
have a question of law or fact in common. When a party to an action relies for
ground of claim or defense upon any statute or executive order administered by
a federal or state governmental officer or agency or upon any regulation, order,
requirement or agreement issued or made pursuant to the statute or executive order,
the officer or agency upon timely application may be permitted to intervene in the
action. In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention
will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2).
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only that there be a common question of law or fact. Permissive intervention is discretionary with the federal judge.
Both subsections (a) and (b) of rule 24 also provide for intervention
when a statute of the United States grants a right to intervene."4 If the
right is absolute, then intervention is of right under rule 24(a). If the
right to intervene is conditional, intervention is permissive under rule
24(b). Typically, such statutes grant intervention to a federal agency to
in a private dispute that may
represent the position of the government
45
have important policy implications.
Rule 24 governs joinder, not jurisdiction. Indeed, joinder rules cannot
grant federal subject matter jurisdiction." In order for an additional
claim to be properly brought in federal court, it must meet both the
requirement of joinder and the requirement of jurisdiction. Rule 24
governs joinder. Section 1367 governs supplemental jurisdiction.
The joinder test of rule 24(a) is stricter than the Gibbs "common
nucleus of operative fact" test of supplemental jurisdiction. 47 A Rule
19 case 48 will serve to illustrate the difference. In Provident Tradesmens
Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson,49 a number of persons injured in a
multiple vehicle accident brought suit to recover against the insurance
company of one of the car owners. The owner, Dutcher, was not made
a party to the lawsuit. He clearly had an interest in the subject matter
consisting of his insurance policy; resolution of the suit could have
affected him through dissipation of the entire proceeds of his liability
coverage. He was, to use the terminology of rule 19, a person "to be
joined if feasible." 50 For 5much the same reason, he could have intervened
but chose not to do so. '

44. FED. R. Crv. P. 24(a)(1), (b)(1).
45. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-2 (Attorney General may intervene of right in civil rights cases);
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (EEOC may permissively intervene in employment discrimination cases).
46. FED. R. Civ. P. 82; see also Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U.S. 236 (1886); Venner v. Great N. Ry.
Co., 209 U.S. 24, 35 (1908).
47. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
48. Rule 19 is closely parallel to rule 24. Rule 19(a) provides:
(a) Persons to Be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process
and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in the person's absence
complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the
disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a practical matter impair
or impede the person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons
already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise
inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest. If the person has not
been so joined, the court shall order that the person be made a party. If the person
should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, the person may be made a defendant,
or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue
and joinder of that party would render the venue of the action improper, that
party shall be dismissed from the action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a).
49. 390 U.S. 102 (1968).
50. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a).
51. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S.102, 114 (1968).
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Hypothetically, Dutcher may also have had a claim against one of
the plaintiffs. For example, he could have disputed the cause of the
accident and sought to recover from one of the plaintiffs for the damage
to his vehicle. Such a claim is related; there is a common nucleus of
operative fact. Dutcher could not intervene as a matter of right to assert
this claim however, because it does not meet the test of rule 24. This
is because payment of insurance proceeds to the plaintiff driver would
not in any way hinder Dutcher in pursuing his claim against that driver.
The claim is sufficiently related to meet the Gibbs "common nucleus
of operative fact" test, but is not related enough to meet the joinder
requirements of rule 24(a). The relationship tests of rule 24 and Gibbs
are not the same.
IV.

SECTION 1367-SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION OVER
INTERVENTION CLAIMS

Unless the Supreme Court retreats from the constitutional standard
that it appeared to adopt in Gibbs, section 1367 will substantially expand
the jurisdiction of federal courts over intervention claims.12 Further, it
is now possible to attempt to define, in theory, the rough contours of
supplemental jurisdiction in intervention cases, and to reconcile supplemental jurisdiction over claims in intervention with accepted doctrines
and principles of supplemental jurisdiction.
A.

Non-Section 1332 Cases
When the entire case is but one constitutional case, federal subject
matter jurisdiction over any one claim provides a sufficient basis, under
3
section 1367(a), for supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims.1 If
it would be constitutional for there to be supplemental jurisdiction over
a claim in intervention, subsection (a) grants that claim supplemental
jurisdiction, so long as the case is not based solely on diversity.
The Article III test is a relationship test. In United Mine Workers of
America v. Gibbs,5 4 the Supreme Court used the language "common

52. Contra Freer, supra note 31, at 476-77, See also Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. et al., Compounding
or Creating Confusion About Supplemental Jurisdiction? A Reply to Professor Freer, 40 EMORY
L.J. 943, 957-59 (1991) (arguing the effect of the change is "a wash"). But see David D. Siegel,
Changes in Federal Jurisdiction and Practice Under New (Dec. 1, 1990) Judicial Improvements Act,
133 F.R.D. 61, 65 (1991) (supporting the view that the statute perhaps unintentionally did change
the understanding of the scope of supplemental jurisdiction). See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL COURTS, 2, 5 (8th ed., Supp. 1990); see also LARRY L. TEPLY
& RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 507-12 (1991).
53. Section 1367(a) states:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise
by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other
claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction
that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United
States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve
the joinder or intervention of additional parties.
54. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
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nucleus of operative fact" to describe this test. It is a factual relationship
test, although it is sometimes said to be a logical dependence test." The
question comes down to whether a court would, unhampered by the
artificial division of subject matter jurisdiction between state and federal6
court, regard the entire controversy as a single case or controversy.1
So long as the claim is related, it does not matter who asserts the claim

under subsection (a).
The court may, under subsection (c), decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction in some cases . 7 The intervention claim may turn on resolution
of a novel or complex issue of state law, better left to the states for
initial resolution. Subsection (c)(1) creates a statutory basis for applying
a doctrine akin to "abstention" for denial of supplemental jurisdiction

in such a case.
Subsection (c) also permits a federal court to dismiss a supplemental
intervention claim when it is not truly supplemental, but rather dominates

the dispute.5" There also will be instances in which the federal claim,

though once substantial, has been dismissed, leaving only the intervenor's

claim or claims before the court.59 Subsection (c)(3) permits, but does
not mandate, a federal court to dismiss the supplemental claims when
the main claim no longer exists. Finally, subsection (c)(4) permits dismissal
of supplemental claims in "exceptional circumstances."60
Diversity: The Additional Requirements of Section 1367(b)
When a case is in federal court solely because of section 1332 diversity
jurisdiction, section 1367(b) introduces additional non-constitutional limitations on supplemental jurisdiction. 61 In diversity cases, Congress has
prohibited supplemental jurisdiction:
B.

55. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377 (1978).
56. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) provides:
(c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim
under subsection (a) if(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the
district court has original jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,
or
(4) in exceptional circumstances there are other compelling reasons for declining
jurisdiction.
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2).
59. Id. § 1367(c)(3).
60. Id. § 1367(c)(4).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) provides:
(b) In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded
solely on section 1332 of this title, the district courts shall not have supplemental
jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs against persons made
parties under Rule 14, 19, 20 or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or
over claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such
rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the
jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.
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over claims by plaintiffs against [intervenors] or over claims by persons seeking to intervene as plaintiffs when exercising supplemental
jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.62
If there is any basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction other than
section 1332 diversity, intervenors need not concern themselves with
subsection (b). Federal question cases, 6a federal tort act cases, 64 and
admiralty cases, 65 for example, are not affected by subsection (b). Neither
are diversity cases that do not arise solely under section 1332. Thus,
statutory interpleader diversity claims 66 are not limited by subsection (b).
In addition, subsection (b) applies only to plaintiffs' claims. Because
only plaintiffs' claims are subject to the special limitations of subsection
(b), the rule in Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger67 marks the
outside boundary of the minimum diversity rule. The rule against supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims is easy to state, but is
particularly difficult to apply in intervention cases. When are intervenors
"proposed to be joined as plaintiffs?" 68 The question is one of alignment.
The requirement of complete diversity "between citizens of different
states" is difficult to apply even in cases where plaintiffs share a joint
or common interest adverse to defendants. The application of, and
justification for, the rule in complex lawsuits is less clear. A typical
approach is to align additional parties on the basis of commonality of
interest.69 In most cases, there really are two sides, although there may
be many parties. In these bi-polar cases, when the intervenor shares a
commonality of interest with one and against other existing parties,
intervenors can be aligned in accordance with their commonality of
interest.
In some cases, the multiple parties are mutually adverse to such a
degree that there are more than two sides to the dispute. In such multipolar cases, when the intervenor's interest is in conflict with both or
all of the original parties, this article
suggests that the rule in Strawbridge
7
v. Curtiss7° should not apply. '

62. Id.
63. Id. § 1331.
64. Id. § 1346(b).
65. Id. § 1333.
66. Id. § 1335.
67. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).
69. See, e.g., Financial Guar. Ins. Co. v. City of Fayetteville, 749 F. Supp. 934 (W.D. Ark.
1990).
70. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267.
71. This approach is consistent with aggregation, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, of
some but not all class actions. In class action cases under rule 23(b)(3), where joinder is based
only on a common question of law or fact, each member of a diversity class must meet the amount
in controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332. When the interests of class members are intertwined,
however, as in rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) cases, they may aggregate. Zahn v. International Paper Co.,
414 U.S. 291 (1973). Diversity jurisdiction in class action cases is not totally consistent. Compare
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The language of subsection 1367(b) recognizes in theory that even a
plaintiff's claim might qualify as supplemental. Subsection (b) requires
the determination by the court whether supplemental jurisdiction "over
claims by plaintiffs" would be "inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332."72 After briefly considering the application
of subsection (b) to claims by original plaintiffs against intervenors, this
article will discuss how the courts might respond to the problem of
multi-polar disputes, either by aligning intervenors as defendants 73 or by
broadly interpreting this final language in subsection (b).
1. Claims By Original Plaintiff Against Intervenor
Subsection (b) prohibits supplemental jurisdiction:
[iln any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded solely on section 1332 . . . over claims by plaintiffs
against persons made parties under Rule 14 . . . of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure . . . when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over

be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirement
such claims would
74
of section 1332.
This language treats plaintiffs' claims against intervenors the same as
plaintiffs' claims under rule 14. In Kroger, the Supreme Court held that
a claim by plaintiff against a party joined under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 14 is not entitled to supplemental jurisdiction. 75 Some commentators have concluded that the effect will be to remove jurisdiction
over intervenors of right. 76 This reading fails to distinguish between the
claims filed by plaintiff subsequent to intervention and ouster of jurisdiction over pre-exiting claims. It was the purpose of the statute to
reach only the former, 7 as the latter are not "inconsistent with the
requirements of § 1332 ' "7 as previously understood.

Zahn, 414 U.S. 291 with Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
When, as in Zahn, the class representative meets the jurisdictional amount in controversy requirement, the issue of aggregation is really an issue of supplemental jurisdiction. Zahn, 414 U.S.
at 305 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The relationship between supplemental jurisdiction and "aggregation"
in Zahn was recognized by the Supreme Court in Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 551 (1980)
the added claims involve added parties over
("[In Finley, as in] Zahn, Aldinger, and Kroger ...
whom no independent basis of jurisdiction exists."). See also Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v.
Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372 (1978). While 28 U.S.C. § 1367 does not, by its terms, control class
actions, the Supreme Court may choose to review its class action cases, in light of the statute that
provides a "single rationalizing principle" of supplemental jurisdiction that has so long been lacking.
Zahn, 414 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).
73. This would not necessarily create a claim by plaintiff, according to the statute's drafters.
Rowe, Jr. et at., supra note 52, at 957-58.
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (West Supp. 1992).
75. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978). There is supplemental jurisdiction,
even in diversity cases, over claims by defendant, as third party plaintiff, against third party
defendant. For pre-statutory cases in accord, see, e.g., H.L. Peterson Co. v. Applewhite, 383 F.2d
430 (5th Cir. 1967); Pennsylvania Ry. Co. v. Erie Avenue Warehouse Co., 302 F.2d 843 (3d Cir.
1962); Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959).
76. JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., 1 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE [hereinafter I MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE]

0.67; see also Freer, supra note 31.

77. Rowe, Jr. et al., supra note 52.
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).
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Perhaps subsection (b) will be interpreted to permit a plaintiff to claim
against an intervenor or an impled third party once that party files a
claim against the plaintiff. 79 Such an attack by the new party against
the plaintiff places the plaintiff in a defensive posture vis-a-vis the
intervenor or third party. In such circumstances, the plaintiff's claim
could be characterized as a counterclaim. The courts are free, under
section 1367(b), to limit or not to limit the effect of Kroger to permit
supplemental jurisdiction where plaintiff is not the aggressor. 0 Again,
there are two avenues for asserting such a limitation; either that plaintiff
is no longer acting as a plaintiff or that defensive plaintiffs' claims are
81
not "inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.1
Subsection (b) limits claims by plaintiff against intervenor, but does
not destroy diversity jurisdiction over a plaintiff's claim once it has
attached. For example, in Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. Public Utilities
Commission,8 2 the plaintiff, a Kansas purchaser of electricity, complained
against defendant regulatory commission ("PUC"). The regulated utility,
also a Kansas company, sought to intervene to support the PUC's new
rates. Neither plaintiff nor intervenor asserted any new claim. Rather,
the issue was whether the presence of the non-diverse intervening defendant had destroyed diversity, necessitating dismissal of the case. The
Supreme Court held that jurisdiction remained.
[Diversity] existed when the suit was begun .... Jurisdiction once
acquired on that ground is not divested by a subsequent change in
the citizenship of the parties .... Much less is such jurisdiction
defeated by the intervention, by leave of the court, of a party whose
presence is not essential to a decision of the controversy between
the original parties. 83
Section 1367 does not change this conclusion. Some fears have been
raised that the statute inadvertently may have ousted the courts of
supplemental jurisdiction over defensive interventions of right in diversity
cases.8 4 There is, under the statute, an apparent equation between claims
joined under rule 19 and under rule 24. It should be remembered,
however, that in the case of subject matter jurisdiction, it is jurisdiction
over claims, not over parties, that is in issue. A joinder under either
rule does not necessarily result in a plaintiff's claim against the joined
party. Even when the plaintiff does seek to recover against the joined
party, the statute could be read to extend supplemental jurisdiction over

79. 1 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 76, 0.98 [41, and 0.67, suggests the "probable
result" will be that plaintiff's counterclaim will not have supplemental jurisdiction under a literal
reading of the statute. In so concluding, the treatise may be giving inadequate consideration to the
concluding phrase of subsection (b).
80. Under subsection (b), the effect of such a construction would be that a plaintiff's counterclaim
would not be "inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332."
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b). Compare Freer, supra note 31, at 481-84, (arguing such defensive
plaintiffs' claims are forbidden by 28 U.S.C. § 1367) with Rowe, Jr. et al., supra note 52, at 959.
82. 260 U.S. 48 (1922).
83. Id. at 54; see also Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U.S. 236 (1886).
0.67.
84. 1 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 76,
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some additional rule 19 joinders and to limit supplemental jurisdiction
over rule 24 joinders. The author suggests that such an extension would
be appropriate in multi-polar cases. 85 In any event, defensive intervenors
have never been considered to violate the complete diversity rule in the
past. It does not now necessarily follow that they will be held to be
"inconsistent with the requirements of section 1332."
2. Claims by Intervenor
In diversity cases, subsection (b) also forbids claims "by persons
proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or
seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules when
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332. 186 The following table describes the operation of subsection (b) in a section 1332
case, where the letter stands for the state of citizenship of the parties.8 7
TABLE 1
Original
parties
N,
N,
N,
N,

v.
v.
v.
v.

C,
C,
C,
C,

N,
N2
C,
C2

Intervenor

Supplemental Jurisdiction under
Subsection (b)-Diversity Cases

as
as
as
as

no supplemental jurisdiction 8
supplemental jurisdiction exists
no supplemental jurisdiction 9
supplemental jurisdiction exists9"

pl.
def.
pl.
def.

Even though the intervenor must be aligned to give meaning to this
statutory framework, the statute gives no guidance as to when the
intervenor should be deemed to be a plaintiff.9' Clearly, the complete
diversity rule will be lost, or nearly so, if a co-claimant who would
destroy diversity can simply permit the other plaintiff to file the lawsuit,
and then join under rule 24 rather than rules 19 or 20. Persons "like"
original plaintiff should not be permitted to assert supplemental jurisdiction in a section 1332 case. Thus, the Wichita Railroad& Light Court

85. See infra notes 90-100 and accompanying text.
86. 28 U.S.C. 1367(b).
87. This chart deals with claims by intervenor, which should be distinguished from the question
of loss of diversity over plaintiff's original claim as in Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U.S. 236 (1886), and
Wichita Railroad & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Kansas, 260 U.S. 48 (1922). See
Rowe, Jr. et al., supra note 52, at 993.
88. Unless consistent with section 1332. Supplemental jurisdiction will be needed if the amount
of the counterclaim does not exceed $50,000.
89. Unless consistent with the requirements of complete diversity.
90. Where the intervenor is diverse, section 1332 jurisdiction will still not exist over a claim by
or against intervenor for $50,000 or less, hence the possibility that supplemental jurisdiction may
be required. If C2 is asserting a claim against C,, the courts could conclude that C, is properly a
plaintiff. Unless the complete diversity rule is limited to bi-polar cases, a mechanical approach to
28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) could result in denying all intervenors into diversity cases supplemental jurisdiction
over claims against the original defendant.
91. Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U.S. 236, 240 (1886).
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aligned the intervenor according to its opposition to the plaintiff. "The
intervention of the Kansas Company, a citizen of the same state as the
Wichita Company,
its opponent, did not take away the ground of diverse
92
citizenship. ,

Similarly, in Phelps v. Oaks93 the issue of alignment was clear; therefore, it was not the subject of judicial analysis. Pennsylvania plaintiffs
were suing the intervenors' tenant to recover possession of real property.
After removal, the defendant's landlords intervened. The Supreme Court
upheld jurisdiction, even though the intervenors were joining as defendants, and, like the plaintiffs, were from Pennsylvania. "It was quite
proper.. .to admit the landlord as a party for the purpose of defending
his tenant's possession and . . . to appear as a party to the record and
codefendant . ...

94

In both Phelps and Wichita Railroad & Light, the Supreme Court
was considering a true defensive intervention. Both were bi-polar, with
the intervening parties falling clearly into defendants' camps. In such
cases, alignment is relatively easy. In FinancialGuaranty Insurance Co.
v. City of Fayetteville,95 the district court realigned parties who had
been joined through intervention and otherwise, in accord with their
interests in the dispute. The court concluded that the parties fell into
two groups; those who supported the city incinerator and those who
opposed it. While the case preceded the enactment of section 1367, the
court's refusal simply to defer to the pleadings is certainly still sound.
Rule 24 does require that the intervenor's first pleading be attached
to the intervention petition. The intervenor may have any number of
potential pleadings, any one of which could be "initial." If, for example,
the intervenor wished to file a claim against both the plaintiff and the
defendant, the initial pleading could be a "complaint" against the defendant and a "cross-claim" against the plaintiff. Or, instead, the intervenor could file an "answer" to the plaintiff's complaint, a
"counterclaim" against the plaintiff, and a "cross-claim" against the
defendant. The litigator who assumes an initial defensive posture may
elude non-observant opponents and jurists, but it is the reality of the
situation, not self-characterization in the pleadings, that governs federal
subject matter jurisdiction. 96 As the district court stated in Financial
Guaranty: "[It is immaterial how the parties may have been designated

92. Wichita R.R. & Light, 260 U.S. at 53-54 (emphasis added).
93. 117 U.S. 236 (1886).
94. Id. at 240 (emphasis added).
95. 749 F. Supp. 934 (W.D. Ark. 1990).
96. In Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978), the plaintiff filed an
amended complaint against the third party defendant. The Supreme Court, however, did not rest
its holding on the state of the pleadings, concluding that a claim by plaintiff under rule 14(a), no
less than a complaint, is still a plaintiff's claim that cannot be sustained in a diversity case, absent
an independent basis of federal subject matter jurisdiction. See also Louisville Nashville Ry. v.
Motley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908); Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950); Horton
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348 (1961).
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since the court must align them for jurisdictional

purposes on the basis of their actual legal interests

. . . .

9

It is the same as if an injured passenger on a crashed airliner sought
to intervene in a suit against the airline company filed by another injured
passenger. The new claimant is intervening as a plaintiff. Similarly, if
a landowner downstream from a dam sues to obtain more water, the
intervening co-owner of that land is also a plaintiff. 98 The claims of
other downstream landowners need not be joint with other plaintiffs to
share a common interest that more water should flow over the dams.
They therefore should be regarded as plaintiffs.
In FinancialGuaranty, as in a multiparty negligence case, the plaintiffs
were mutually opposed to the defendant. If the question had been which
of two sites to use as a landfill, however, alignment of an intervenor
asserting yet a third site would not have been such a simple matter.
Similarly, in the dam hypothetical, if some downstream or upstream
landowners wish to intervene to claim that too much rather than too
little water is being released by the defendant dam owner, they are
"like" plaintiffs in that they are against the defendant, but they are
also "like" defendants in opposing the original plaintiff's acts.
To the extent that alignment as "plaintiff" turns on an intervenor's
affinity with existing parties, the test cannot be adequate in a multipolar situation. In such situations, the intervenor is neither "like" the
plaintiff nor "like" the defendant. In multi-polar cases, the commonality
of interest approach cannot effectively operate to align an intervenor
whose interest is not common with any existing party. 99
Furthermore, the decision in Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v.
Kroger1°0 does not resolve this issue. In that case, the Court had before
it the quintessential plaintiff-a person seeking affirmative relief who
initiated the lawsuit, and against whom no affirmative relief was sought.
Under the narrowest possible construction of Kroger, no intervenor would

97. Financial Guaranty, 749 F. Supp. at 941; see also 1 MoorE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note
0.7411].
98. This joint owner is a rule 19 party who should have been joined originally. The joint owner,
however, may not be able to intervene of right under rule 24(a) because of adequate representation.
In such cases, if intervention were permitted under rule 24(b), there would be supplemental jurisdiction
under Gibbs. Article III of the United States Constitution would not forbid the exercise of federal
supplemental jurisdiction, although, in a section 1332 case, section 1367 probably does.
99. In an interesting dialogue, Professor Freer fears the statutory language will prevent supplemental jurisdiction over defendant intervenors since this automatically will raise a plaintiff's claim
against them. Freer, supra note 31 (citing Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), and citing Helzberg's
Diamond Shops v. Valley West Des Moines Shopping Center, 564 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1977)).
Professors Rowe, Burbank, and Mengler attempt to distinguish defendants against whom plaintiff
has a claim for wrongdoing from other defendants. Rowe, Jr. et al., supra note 52, at 943. Professors
Freer and Arthur recognize the difficulties in attempting to draw such a distinction. Thomas C.
Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Close Enough for Government Work: What Happens When Congress
Doesn't Do Its Job, 40 EMORY L.J. 1007, 1010 (1991) (noting that these cases are "similar to
interpleader suits" without a res); Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Grasping at Burnt Straws:
The Disaster of the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 963 (1991). That is, the
dispute is multi-polar and particularly deserving of supplemental jurisdiction.
100. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
76,
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be the plaintiff, and thus the language in subsection (b), "claim by
intervening plaintiff," would have no meaning. Therefore, if this language
of subsection (b) is to have any meaning, the Kroger principle must
extend to cases in which the claimant was not originally a party plaintiff.
Nor can all claiming intervenors be characterized as plaintiffs merely
because they voluntarily enter the lawsuit to file a claim. 01
When an intervenor can be readily aligned in interest "against" one
02
and "with" another party, the Kroger corollary to Strawbridge v. Curtiss
can effectively define the boundary between supplemental jurisdiction
and the complete diversity rule. The application of the "plaintiff's claim"
limitation on the complete diversity rule confounds rather than clarifies
analysis when the intervenor is one of many claimants who are mutually
adverse. Such cases can be held to be supplemental by "deeming" the
intervenor not to be a plaintiff, a justifiable if complicated approach
that only raises a new question as to whether the original plaintiff's
diversity has been destroyed. More honestly, the issue is whether 'the
joined claim is "inconsistent with the requirements of section 1332. 103
C. "Inconsistent With the Requirements of Section 1332"
Subsection 1367(b) forbids supplemental jurisdiction only if it would
be "inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332."
The structure of the language indicates that this phrase modifies and
limits the foreclosure of plaintiffs' claims in a section °1332 diversity
case. The reference is clearly to Strawbridge v. Curtiss.'0
The precise meaning and scope of Strawbridge has remained an enigma
since it was decided by the Court in 1806. Nearly two centuries later,
in subsection 1367(b), Congress eschewed any attempt at codification
other than to limit its effect to plaintiff's claims. Complete diversity is
required except, of course, when supplemental jurisdiction is available. 0 5
The complete diversity rule does not apply to statutory interpleader
cases. When there are multiple adverse claimants to a single fund,
minimum diversity between two claimants will suffice for jurisdiction
under section 1335. Initially, the complete diversity rule applied only
when there was a single joint claim by multiple parties rather than many
separate and independent claims united under the liberal joinder rules
now available. The Supreme Court stated that it did "not mean to give
an opinion in the case where several parties represent several distinct
interests, and some of those parties are, and others are not [diverse]."''

101. If this was the intent of Congress it could have simply denied supplemental jurisdiction to
"claims in intervention," not just claims by intervening plaintiff. Neither should the voluntary
appearance of a defendant be cause for doubting the well established rule that defendants' compulsory
counterclaims are supplemental. Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
102. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
103. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).
104. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
105. Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130 (1855).
106. Strawbridge, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 267-68.
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This "separate and distinct" language of the Strawbridge court was
07
for years a cause of substantial controversy. In Hooe v. Jamieson,1
the Court extended the rule to require complete diversity over each of
four owners of undivided interests of land held in common and not
jointly. Under a strict system of joinder quite unlike our own, it was
difficult to see what kinds of claims, if any, were reserved by this
language. Indeed, for a time it was thought that the complete diversity
rule could not be abrogated, even by Congress, absent a "separate and
independent claim." 10
In adopting section 1335, Congress implicitly recognized what the Court
intuited when it reserved the issue of what to do with cases in which

there were "several distinct interests;" the complete diversity rule operates
properly only in bi-polar disputes. In a multi-polar case, State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire,109 the Supreme Court concluded that
the "separate and independent" requirement was not a constitutional
requirement of Article III. Strawbridge is a gloss on section 1332, not
Article III. In subsection 1367(b), Congress limited the scope of the
complete diversity rule to plaintiffs' claims. Even as to plaintiffs' claims,
Congress provided that they would only be denied supplemental jurisdiction if "inconsistent with section 1332."''1 If this language means
anything, it means that some plaintiffs' claims may be supplemental.
The need for supplemental jurisdiction in order to adjudicate disputes
fully, fairly, and efficiently is particularly strong in the case of joinder
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) in a multi-polar dispute.
The intervenor claims an interest in the subject of the action, and not
only is he not adequately represented by the existing parties, but in fact
both original parties are hostile to the intervenor.
Not all such cases are interpleaders, but there is frequently a close
relationship between intervention and interpleader. For example, in K.G.
Poland v. Atlantis Credit Corp,"' a ship had been totally destroyed,
resulting in losses to the owner, the mortgage holder, and numerous
creditors. The insurance carriers interpled the owner, mortgagee, and
some creditors. Others quite properly sought to intervene. The court did
not address supplemental jurisdiction in that case. Even in interpleader
cases brought under rule 22, however, where the minimum diversity rule
does not apply, there is precedent for upholding supplemental juris-

107. 166 U.S. 395 (1897).
108. See Marilyn J. Ireland, Entire Case Removal Under 1441(c): Toward a Unified Theory of
Additional Parties and Claims in Federal Courts, 11 IND. L. REV. 555, 573 (1978). The joint/
several dichotomy fails to tell the entire story of potential relationships among multiple parties in
a complex lawsuit. A claim may be neither joint nor a mere convenience; that is, a claim may be
separate and adverse yet so interconnected that the various distinct claims cannot practically be
resolved except in a single controversy.
109. 386 U.S. 523, 530 (1967).
110. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).
111. 179 F. Supp. 863 (D.N.Y. 1960); see also Teague v. Bakker, 931 F.2d 259 (4th Cir. 1991);
Kreditt Bank v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 303 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1962); McKeithen v. Frosta, 75
F.R.D. 7 (E.D. La. 1977); Dyna Tel v. Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg. Co., No. 86-C-8893, 1990 WL
115601 (N.D. 111.Aug. 7, 1990).
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diction. 1 2 The intervening creditors are neither plaintiffs, nor are their
adverse claims inconsistent with section 1332.
When a case is already pending pursuant to statutory interpleader, an
additional intervening claimant need not rely on section 1367 for supplemental jurisdiction. Since section 1335 permits minimum diversity,
the non-diverse intervenor can nonetheless rely on minimum diversity
for jurisdiction. In this sense, section 1335 creates its own basis of
supplemental jurisdiction. If it did not, supplemental jurisdiction would
exist under section 1367.13
In some multi-polar cases, section 1335 jurisdiction may not be the
original basis of the subject matter jurisdiction. A plaintiff may have
overlooked the availability of section 1335, or may not have wished to
deposit the disputed res into court, as required by section 1335. Perhaps,
until the intervention was filed, the dispute appeared to have been bipolar. For example, a plaintiff may have asserted that a defendant
insurance company should pay an obligation on an insurance policy.
Only later may the plaintiff discover that it is not the sole claimant.
Also, the intervention may for the first time reveal the minimum
diversity among claimants necessary for the assertion of section 1335
jurisdiction. Since the inception of such a case, section 1335 jurisdiction
arguably existed even though this basis of jurisdiction was not initially
pled. Section 1335 does not, however, provide a jurisdictional basis for
all multi-polar interventions." '4 If the intervenor is diverse from the
plaintiff, but not from the defendant, section 1335 jurisdiction will not
exist. In such a case, section 1367 should provide the necessary jurisdiction.
Numerous complex problems respecting alignment of parties and the
scope of section 1335 will be avoided if supplemental jurisdiction is
available in all multi-polar intervention cases. Further, the fair and
efficient resolution of such an entire case will not substantially undermine
the complete diversity rule. The federal courts are free to exercise such
jurisdiction under the broad authority granted by Congress in subsection
(b), and in a manner that would be consistent with the language of
Strawbridge v. Curtiss."'5 Rule 19 and section 1335, or rule 24 and section
1367, achieve the same result in ensuring that all related claims are heard
together.
V.

CHANGES IN PRE-STATUTORY LAW

Pre-statutory cases often turned on criteria that are not mentioned in
section 1367. It was sometimes said, for example, that only interventions

112. See Walmac Co. v. Isaacs, 220 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1955).
113. The limits of section 1367(b) apply only to section 1332 diversity, not section 1335 diversity.
114. Some interpleaders qualify for 28 U.S.C. § 1332 but not § 1335 diversity because of a lack
of diversity between claimants. E.g., Underwriters at Lloyd's v. Nichols, 363 F.2d 357 (8th Cir.
1966). Further, a disputed duty may not provide the fund necessary for interpleader.
115. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
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of right could be supplemental; permissive intervention needed its own
basis of subject matter jurisdiction." 6 A modification permitted supplemental jurisdiction if the basis of personal jurisdiction was in rem but
not if it was in personam." 7 In addition, persons intervening as plaintiffs
could not utilize supplemental jurisdiction, at least not in diversity cases.18
Finally, if the intervenors were regarded as indispensable, under Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 19" 9 the case would have to be dismissed.
There are three pre-statutory limitations on supplemental intervention:
(1) the intervention of right/permissive intervention distinction; (2) the
in rem/in personam distinction; and (3) the indispensable problem. It
is the author's contention that, under section 1367, the distinction between
permissive and compulsory intervention cannot stand. 20 Similarly, a
special rule for in rem cases, if ever justifiable, finds no basis in
section 1367.121 Section 1367 does require a main claim to which the
intervening claim can be supplemental. Thus, essential parties cannot,
22
through intervention, salvage a plaintiff's original jurisdictionless claim.
Yet, the practical tests of rule 19 "indispensability" cannot be mechanically applied to determine jurisdiction.
Permissive Intervention and Intervention of Right
It was assumed that prior to enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 permissive
intervention claims required an independent basis of federal subject matter
jurisdiction.' 23 The district court held this in Curtis v. American Book
Co., 24 citing as rationale numerous cases which held that interventions
of right, but not permissive interventions, are supplemental.
Curtis cited Phelps v. Oaks,'21 as did the Supreme Court in dicta in
Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co. 26 While it may be true that under the
modern joinder rules, the intervening landlords in Phelps could now
intervene of right under rule 24(a)(2), they were entitled to intervene at
the time under a Missouri statute. The Court concluded as follows:
A.

[I]t is claimed that, under the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
State [of Missouri] the right of the owner or warrantor of the title
[intervening landlord) to be let in as a party to defend, does not rest
in the discretion of the court, but is absolute (citation omitted). It
is assumed that the [Missouri] statute is equally obligatory upon the

116. JAmEs W. MooRE & JOHN E. KENNEDY, 3B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE [hereinafter 3B
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE] 1 24.18 (2d ed. 1992).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See infra notes 108-27 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 128-46 and accompanying text.
122. See infra notes 147-56 and accompanying text.
123. 7 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 1923, at 629 (1984).
124. 137 F. Supp. 950, 951-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). Although this was a strongly held view, some
courts were not fully convinced. See Secretary of Labor v. King, 775 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1985).
125. 117 U.S. 236 (1886).
126. 414 U.S. 291, 306 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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courts of the United States. But this is a mistake . . . . Certainly it
was not intended that these [state joinder] statutes were to be adopted
with the effect of defeating the jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States ...

127

Neither does jurisdiction 28turn on federal joinder rules, which was not
even an issue in Phelps.
In spite of numerous recitations of the supposed coincidence of rule
24(a)(2) and supplemental jurisdiction by highly reliable commentators, 129
the rule rests on an insecure foundation. In a 1969 article, Professor
Kennedy cited only a few district court cases on point. 30 It must be
remembered that prior to the decision in Owen Equipment & Erection
Co. v. Kroger,3 ' there was only a hazy line marking the boundary between
complete diversity and supplemental jurisdiction. The courts and commentators were struggling to find a line of demarcation. For example,
in one of the earliest cases relied upon by Professor Kennedy, Maryland
ex rel. Carnesdale v. Rolen, 3 2 a permissive intervenor was attempting to
join as plaintiff in a negligence action. Under subsection 1367(b) this is
totally improper, not because the intervention is permissive, but rather
because it is a plaintiff's intervention in a diversity case.
In the only pre-statutory scholarly article to focus exclusively on the
subject of supplemental jurisdiction over claims in intervention, Professor
Fraser properly reasoned that "the same test is used to determine when
a person can intervene as a matter of right under rule 24(a)(2) and when
[supplemental] jurisdiction exists.' ' 3 3 Indeed, it is the relationship between
the claims and not the joinder rules that create supplemental jurisdiction.
Professor Fraser analogized the rule against supplemental jurisdiction over
permissive interventions to the rule against supplemental jurisdiction over
permissive counterclaims. Unfortunately, if (as section 1367 suggests) the
same test is to govern all supplemental jurisdiction, regardless of the
form of the joinder, the analogy is faulty. The relational test of compulsory counterclaims is much less demanding than the relational test of
intervention of right. These different tests cannot both be the same test
as the common nucleus of operative facts relational test.
The court cited by Professor Fraser explained the relationship between
supplemental jurisdiction and joinder quite effectively. 3 4 Supplemental
jurisdiction does not arise, or fail, because the counterclaim is compulsory
or permissive. Rather, the test of rule 13(a) happens to be the same as
the test of supplemental jurisdiction. The Third Circuit has stated that:

127. Phelps, 117 U.S. at 238-39 (1886).
128. FED. R. Civ. P. 82.
0.67 n.14 (1992).
129. E.g., I MooaE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 76,
130. John E. Kennedy, Let's All Join In: Intervention Under Federal Rule 24, 57 Ky. L.J. 329,
361 n.95, 363 n.106 (1969).
131. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
132. 124 F. Supp. 86 (D. Md. 1954).
133. George B. Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdiction of Federal Courts of Persons Whose Interest May
be Impaired If Not Joined,. 62 F.R.D. 483 (1974).
134. See Maryland ex rel. Carnesdale v. Rolen, 124 F. Supp. 86 (D. Md. 1954).
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[a] federal court has [supplemental] jurisdiction of the subject matter
of a counterclaim if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter of an opposing party's claim of which the
court has jurisdiction. Similarly, a counterclaim that arises out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of an opposing
party's claim is a "compulsory counterclaim" within the meaning of
Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Such a statement
of the law relating to [supplemental] jurisdiction of counterclaims is
not intended to suggest that Rule 13(a) extends the jurisdiction of
the federal courts to entertain counterclaims for the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure cannot expand the jurisdiction of the United States
courts. What is meant is that the issue of the existence of [supplemental] jurisdiction and the issue as to whether a counterclaim is
compulsory are to be answered by the same test.' 35

Compulsory counterclaims are entitled to supplemental jurisdiction and
permissive counterclaims are not. 13 6 This is not because of the compulsory/
permissive distinction, however, but rather because a counterclaim is
compulsory only if it meets the "same transaction" test of rule 13(a).
This is a factual relationship test that is a close surrogate to the "common

nucleus" test of supplemental jurisdiction. 3 7 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24, pertaining to intervention of right, applies a totally different
test.

Section 1367(a) establishes the same constitutionally defined test for
counterclaims, cross-claims, impleaders, and claims in intervention. Unlike
permissive counterclaims, permissive cross claims are, for the most part,
entitled to supplemental jurisdiction. 38 Like compulsory counterclaims
they are, by definition, factually related. Similarly, impleaders by defendant are factually related indemnification claims. For this reason, they
have supplemental jurisdiction. 1
135. Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631, 633 (3d Cir. 1961).
136. Permissive counterclaims cannot rely on supplemental jurisdiction because, by definition of
rule 13(b), they are not factually related.
137. Professor Freer remarks on the "confluence" of the transactional joinder test with the test
for jurisdiction. Freer, supra note 31. Note that the transactional test is not the test of rule 24(a)(2);
hence, there is no confluence.
138. Unrelated cross-claims cannot be brought under rule 13(g). Thus, except in diversity cases,
all cross claims have supplemental jurisdiction. In diversity cases, the additional requirements of
section 1367(b) prevent a plaintiff's cross claims from being supplemental if they would violate the
complete diversity rule of section 1332. But see Danner v. Anskis, 256 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1958)
(correctly concluding under pre-statutory analysis that plaintiff's diversity cross claim had to be
dismissed, but confusing joinder and jurisdiction).
139. The Supreme Court in Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978),
recognized that related permissive claims are entitled to supplemental jurisdiction. Section 1367(a)
applies the same supplemental jurisdiction test to rules 14 and 24. To have supplemental jurisdiction,
an intervention claim must be related enough to meet the test of United Mine Workers of America
v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
Plaintiff's impleaders under rule 14(b) are, in a diversity case, not supplemental. Similarly, factually
related claims by a plaintiff against a rule 14(a) third party defendant are not supplemental in a
diversity case. If the third party defendant claims against the plaintiff, the plaintiff's counterclaim
is a claim by the plaintiff that may or may not be consistent with complete diversity. This is one
of the questions left open by the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b). It is also unclear whether
subsection (b) would apply when the original claim is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1332, but there are
additional claims by parties other than plaintiffs that are based on section 1331 jurisdiction to
which the claim in question might be deemed supplemental.
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Some interventions will fail to meet the stringent test of rule 24(a)
intervention of right, but will still be as factually related as, for example,
a compulsory counterclaim. Rule 24(b) requires only that there be a
"common question of law or facts." Therefore, some permissive intervention claims will not meet the test in United Mine Workers of America
v. Gibbs,'4 0 requiring a common nucleus of operative fact. This does not
mean that no permissive interventions are supplemental. 14 1 In Figure 1,
the area between point "x" and point "y" illustrates those permissive
intervention claims that logically should be entitled to supplemental jurisdiction under subsection 1367(a).

Figure 1
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Simply put, neither the test of permissive intervention nor the test of
intervention of right serve as sufficient surrogates for Article III. Therefore, under subsection 1367(a) the courts should undertake an independent
analysis of jurisdiction, one unconfused by totally different joinder tests
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Deference to the role of Congress has been cited as a primary reason
for withholding supplemental jurisdiction in cases of permissive intervention. One commentator has stated that:
[pirocedurally, it may be very desirable to permit the [supplemental
jurisdiction in permissive] intervention and perhaps Congress should act
to allow joinder where there is jurisdiction over one of the claims. But,
until Congress acts, it would constitute an undue expansion of federal42
jurisdiction to dispense with independent jurisdictional requirements.'
In adopting section 1367, Congress has acted to eliminate all impediments43
to supplemental jurisdiction except those created by the Constitution,
by the requirements of section 1332 diversity,' 44 or by the special considerations enumerated in subsection (c). 45 Therefore, section 1367 should

140. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
141. 3B MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 116.

142. Id. 24.18(1].
143. U.S. CONST. art. 111.
144. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
145. Id.

§ 1367(c).

Winter 19931

SUPPLEMENTAL

JURISDICTION

erase doubts as to the propriety of supplemental jurisdiction in appropriate
permissive intervention cases.
In addition to intervention under relatedness tests, rule 24 provides for
intervention when a federal statute confers an absolute or conditional
right to intervene.146 So long as the federal statute confers that right
respecting only related issues, intervention under rule 24(a)(1) also is
entitled to supplemental jurisdiction. The particular exceptions of subsection 1367(b) and (c), of course, apply.
B.

The In-Rem/In-Personam Distinction
Section 1367 also eliminates the dubious use of old personal jurisdiction divisions to determine supplemental jurisdictions. It has been
said that permissive intervention could be supplemental in in rem cases,
but not in in personam cases. 147 In rem cases supposedly were more
likely to "ripen into an absolute right" to intervene. 4 The reason for
"ripening" was never the personal jurisdictional base of the lawsuit;
rather, it was the remedy that would ultimately be awarded. And neither
the base of personal jurisdiction nor the remedy sought is the constitutional test of subsection 1367(a).
Neither in Wichita Railroad & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Kansas, 49 nor in Phelps v. Oaks,1"0 nor in any other case,
has the Supreme Court applied any limitation on the subject matter
jurisdiction based on the now obsolete categorization of personal jurisdiction into in rem and in personam. One court"'5 has suggested that
the res requirement arose from a rather zealous reading of Hoffman3
2 in a student comment in the Harvard Law Review."
v. McClelland"1
Regardless of its source, the rule finds no basis in the United States
Constitution or in section 1367.
If there was ever a doctrinal difference between in rem and in
personam cases, that difference has significantly blurred." 54 In Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,' the Court declined to adopt
the in rem/in personam distinction as the test of personal jurisdiction
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
Distinctions between actions in rem and those in personam are
ancient and originally expressed in procedural terms what seems
really to have been a distinction in the substantive law of property
under a system quite unlike our own .... It is not readily apparent

146. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(i), (b)(i).
147. Reedsburg Bank v. Apollo, 508 F.2d 995 (7th Cir. 1975); see also Curtis v. American Book
Co., 137 F. Supp. 950, 951 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), and cases cited therein.
148. 3B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 116, 124.18[1].
149. 260 U.S. 48 (1922).
150. 117 U.S. 236 (1886).
151. Sun Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 88 F. Supp. 658 (S.D. Tx. 1950).
152. 264 U.S. 552 (1924).
153. See Note, Federal Jurisdiction Over Ancillary Jurisdiction, 55 HAgv. L. REV. 264, 266 (1941).
154. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
155. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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how the courts of New York did or would classify the present
proceeding, which has some characteristics and is wanting in some
features of proceedings both in rem and in personam. But in any
event we think that the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution do not depend upon a classification for
which the standards are so elusive and confused generally .... 156
The in rem/in personam standards are not only elusive and confused
under the Fourteenth Amendment; they are also elusive, confused, and
irrelevant to Article III.
The basis of personal jurisdiction is only indirectly related to the
subject matter of a claim. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co.
v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.'5 7 provides a useful illustration.
The proceeds of a liability insurance policy were at issue in the case.
Theoretically, the case might have been brought by personal service
on the insurance company-in personam. Alternatively, it might have
begun by a writ of attachment of the policy-in rem. In either event,
a claim by or against Dutcher, the intervening policy owner, is the
same. 158 The real difference lies in the nature of the claim and of the
relief sought, not in the nature of the court's personal jurisdiction.
For example, a non-diverse, non-admiralty claim for personal relief
by an intervenor in an admiralty case is similar to the claim which
the Supreme Court denied in Finley v. United States.15 9 In both situations, an additional state claim is brought by or against someone
who was not a party to the original federal claim. 60 It was the intent
of Congress to overturn Finley and to grant supplemental jurisdiction
even where additional parties as well as additional claims are joined. 6'
Therefore, under subsection 1367(a), courts in admiralty do have supplemental subject matter jurisdiction to hear state claims by62and against
permissive intervenors, even if the claim is in personam.
In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 63 the Supreme Court
upheld the grant of jurisdiction over non-diverse interpleader claimants
in section 1335. When two or more diverse parties have adverse claims
to a single thing, debt, or duty federal courts can adjudicate additional

156. Id. at 312 (1950); see also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
157. 390 U.S. 102 (1968).
158. There is a difference between a claim by Dutcher to recover against the policy and a claim
by Dutcher to recover personally against one of the other claimants. When the former situation
exists, intervention should be of right. Even where the conflict has not "ripened," resolution of
the case "may as a practical matter" effect the intervenor. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a). The precursor
to rule 24 required an interest in the property that was the subject of the lawsuit. This perhaps
led to the current confusion.
159. 490 U.S. 545 (1980).
160. In an in rem case, it is possible to pretend that the intervenor was present all along, at
least to the extent that anyone is a party in an in rem case.
161. See John B. Oakley, Recent Statutory Changes in the Law of FederalJurisdictionand Venue:
The Judicial Improvements Acts of 1988 and 1990, 24 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 735, 763 (1991).
162. The claim might be refused on some other basis. A federal court may simply deny permissive
interventions under its rule 24(b) discretion. Therefore, there is no need for complex rules of
supplemental jurisdiction to prevent joinder of undesirable permissive intervention claims.
163. 386 U.S. 523 (1967).
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claims of non-diverse parties.' 64 This is not because personal jurisdiction
is in rem. Federal interpleader cases rely on in personam, not in rem,
personal jurisdiction. 65 Rather, the additional claims can be adjudicated
because the requirement of complete diversity applies only under section
1332, not section 1335.
C. Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Rule 19 Plaintiffs:
Indispensability
Section 1367 does not mention the pre-statutory requirement that
intervenors, to be entitled to supplemental jurisdiction, may not be
essential to the jurisdiction of the court. Some commentators have
equated this requirement with the factors of rule 19(b) for determining
when to regard an absent party as indispensable. 66 Because rule 19
has substituted a practical test for a jurisdictional test of "indispensability," the analogy is imprecise. When an absent party is truly
essential to the court's jurisdiction there can have been no claim pending
to serve as a fulcrum upon which supplemental jurisdiction might attach.
In the words of the Supreme Court in Wichita Railroad & Light Co.
v. Public Utilities Commission, 67 the Kansas intervenor was "not essential to a decision of the controversy between the original parties
.... The Kansas Company, while it had' 68an interest and was a proper
party, was not an indispensable party."'
The quintessential indispensable party is the sole defendant. Plaintiff
absolutely must join the defendant against whom recovery is sought.
The defendant is not merely necessary, but is indispensable. Supplemental jurisdiction cannot supply the basis for subject matter jurisdiction over the original claim against the indispensable defendant since
there is no main claim, absent the indispensable party, to which to
add any supplemental claim.
When extended to additional parties, the logic continues to be impeccable, but the result is often counter-intuitive. Logically, if the claim
in intervention is by a person who is so related that he or she should
have been joined, the failure to join can be cured by intervention. If
the relationship between the outside party and the dispute is so strong
that the party is indispensable, however, there is no main claim and
the case must be dismissed. This logic reverses the process of denying
supplemental jurisdiction, under United Mine Workers of America v.
Gibbs, 69 because the claim is too unrelated. Rather, the intervenor is
too related for there to be supplemental jurisdiction. Figure 2 (next
page) illustrates the situation.

164. Id.
165. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916).
166. E.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. et al., A Coda on Supplemental Jurisdiction, 40
993, 997 (1991).
167. 260 U.S. 48 (1922).
168. Id.at 53.
169. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
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The logical fallacy of this approach is obvious. If you can proceed
without the intervenor, the intervenor can intervene; but, if you cannot
proceed without the intervenor, the intervenor cannot intervene. It was
to avoid this tautological approach that rule 19 was amended, replacing
the jurisdictional test of indispensability with a practical and flexible test.
jurisdictional, and should
The test of "indispensability" in rule 19 is not
1 70
not be misapplied to determine jurisdiction.
Rule 19 replaces an earlier version of compulsory party joinder that
was more jurisdictional in approach. 7 ' Under old rule 19, persons were
"necessary" if they claimed an interest in the subject of the dispute,
and "indispensable" if they would be bound by the judgment. In a sense,
the indispensable party, as someone bound, had to be regarded as a

170. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Indispensable Party: The Historical Origin of a Procedural Phantom,
61 COLUM. L. Rav. 1254 (1961); see also Richard D. Freer, Rethinking Compulsory Joinder: A
Proposal to Restructure Federal Rule 19, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1061, 1087 (1985). Contra Rowe, Jr.
et al., supra note 166, at 997.
171. Rule 19(b) currently provides:
Determination by Court Whenever Joinder Not Feasible. If a person as described
in subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine
whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties
before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent
a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to the person or
those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the
judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened
or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be
adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action
is dismissed for nonjoinder.
FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b).
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party. Dismissal of a case for non-joinder of an indispensable party was
a jurisdictional defect.
Under rule 19, if joinder is not possible, the federal court must determine
whether it should proceed piecemeal, thus shaping a less than complete
judgment in order to avoid prejudice. If this proves impractical, the
absent party is deemed "indispensable."'1 7 2 In this case, judicial efficiency
and the interest of justice to the parties and non-parties, not absence of
jurisdiction, dictate that the better course would be to dismiss the lawsuit.
Rule 24, governing intervention, was also re-written when rule 19 was
amended. Rule 24, like rule 19, reflects this pragmatic approach to joinder
and deviates from the jurisdictional approach. In general, rule73 24(a)(2)
grants intervention of right whenever rule 19 requires joinder.
This practical test of rule 19(b) "indispensability" focuses on protecting
the interests of the parties in the absence of the outside party, and on
the efficacy and efficiency of a partial judgment. 74 Rule 19(b) speaks
of prejudice to the outside persons, or to the adequacy of a judgment
in their absence. In an intervention case, no such prejudice will occur;
intervention will solve the problem or the case will be dismissed. Similarly,
the exercise under rule 19(b) of shaping relief is a purely theoretical
exercise when an intervenor is present. Either the court will render a
complete judgment or none at all. A practical approach to determine
what to do when parties are absent is not an effective approach to decide
whether to admit them.
Where the outside party is knocking on the courthouse door, it is at
best artificial to rely on the tests of rule 19(b). The purpose of changing
rules 19 and 24 was to introduce a pragmatic joinder test to replace a
jurisdictional test. It would be improper now to attempt directly to apply
these tests to jurisdictional analysis. As one commentator has stated:
It would be unfortunate if Section 1367's overall policy of encouraging
efficient joinder and consistent adjudication were thwarted by a construction of Section 1367(b) that ruled out supplemental jurisdiction
over a nondiverse intervenor in a diversity action whose interest in
the action qualifies the intervenor as merely a Rule 19(a) "necessary"
party [footnote omitted] but not as a Rule 19(b) "indispensable"
party. 75
Not only would it be unfortunate, but it would be counter to the purpose
of rules 19 and 24, and to section 1367.
If the intervenor is intervening as a plaintiff, section 1367(b) will
ordinarily preclude supplemental jurisdiction in a permissive intervention

172. Id.
173. Rule 24 adds a requirement of non-representation. In addition, there may be statutory grounds
for intervention of right, even when the test of rule 19 is not met.
174. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102 (1968).
175. Oakley, supra note 161, at 765-66. On the possible other readings of the coincidence of
rules 19 and 24, see Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Grasping at Burnt Straws: The Disaster
of the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 963, 966-74 (1991). The primary concern
is that whatever interpretation prevails, there will be no easy evasion of the complete diversity rule.
Rowe, Jr. et al., supra note 166.
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case. For example, if one injured airplane passenger seeks to intervene
into a lawsuit filed by another passenger, there is no reason why the
intervenor should be entitled to a federal forum merely because a fellow
passenger injured in the same accident happened to be diverse from the
air carrier. It does not necessarily follow, however, that there is no
supplemental jurisdiction over joinder or intervention by a landowner
who may be effected by litigation respecting a dam. The issue is not
whether the party was an original party or an intervening party, nor is
it whether the party is "necessary" or "indispensable."' 7 6 Instead, it is
whether the claim is related, and, in a diversity case, whether an interis
vening party would be regarded as a plaintiff whose additional claim
17
"inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.'
When failure to join a party is jurisdictional, the error cannot be
corrected by supplemental jurisdiction. However, in other cases there is
a separate and distinct dispute between existing parties. It should be
permitted to serve as the main claim so long as it has a basis of federal
subject matter jurisdiction. Even where the only possible relief is "in
kind" and will "as a practical matter impair or impede" the interests
of others, a main claim may exist that could have stood alone. If there
are competing interests which are several and distinct, subject matter
jurisdiction over one of them should suffice for supplemental jurisdiction
over the rest, regardless of whether the joinder is pursuant to rule 24
or to rule 19.
The issue left unclear by subsection 1367(b) is not whether the party
should be regarded as "necessary" rather than "indispensable"; it is
whether the intervening party whose claim cannot reasonably be forced
into a bi-polar dispute model will be foreclosed by the rule in Strawbridge
78

v. Curtiss,1

VI.

CONCLUSION

Ancillary and pendant jurisdiction were at odds with the basic rule
that lower federal courts obtain jurisdiction by statute rather than by
assuming power. Therefore, those courts were reluctant to expand these
concepts. 79 In section 1367, Congress has given the federal courts a
statutory mandate to continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, and
to do so liberally. In subsection (a), Congress authorized the federal
courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction to the extent permitted by
Article III of the United States Constitution.
Before enactment of section 1367, the federal courts were particularly
reluctant to extend federal judicial power over claims in intervention.

176. Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U.S. 236, 239 (1886).
177. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).
178. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
179. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807). Ancillary and pendant law were at odds
with this philosophy because they had no basis in a federal statute. This jurisprudential difficulty
is rectified by creation, in 28 U.S.C. § 1367, of a statutory basis for supplemental jurisdiction.

Winter 19931

SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION

Section 1367 is a clear message by Congress to the federal courts that
they should not shirk from resolving an entire dispute in an efficient
manner, regardless of the form of joinder.
There must, of course, be a main claim properly pending in federal
court. Absent such a main claim, supplemental intervention claims are
not possible. The factors of rule 19(b), however, are not designed to
determine jurisdictional indispensability. The grain of truth, in pre-statutory cases, that the intervention cannot cure failure to join an essential
party should not be read to elevate rule 19 to jurisdictional dimensions
under section 1367. Other pre-statutory limitations that forbid supplemental jurisdiction over interventions, or over permissive interventions in
in personam cases, find no support in the broad statutory grant of
authority of section 1367. In non-diversity cases, Article III is the only
limitation on supplemental jurisdiction.
In section 1332 diversity cases, section 1367 limits supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims. In federal question cases, federal tort claim
act cases, admiralty cases, statutory interpleader cases, and other non1332 cases, the special rules of section 1367(b) governing plaintiffs' claims
by and against intervenors do not apply. Only in section 1332 cases are
plaintiffs' claims not supplemental if "inconsistent with the jurisdictional
requirements of section 1332." That is, Strawbridge v. Curtiss8 ° continues
to govern diversity cases. The Kroger'8' corollary to Strawbridge, adopted
by Congress in subsection (b), forbids plaintiffs from asserting supplemental jurisdiction, at least in the typical case.
It is relatively easy to identify claims by a plaintiff against an intervenor.
Subsection (b), however, provides no guidance as to when a claim by
an intervenor should be regarded as a claim by a person "proposed to
be joined as plaintiff." 1 82 In making this determination, the courts are
not likely simply to defer to the characterization of the intervenor in the
intervenor's pleadings. Nor is a total foreclosure of all claims by an
intervenor supported by the language of the statute. In most cases, an
intervenor can be aligned with an existing party because of a commonality
of interest. In a multi-polar dispute, this approach is not satisfactory
because the intervenor does not share a common interest with either the
plaintiff or the defendant.
This article suggests that the complete diversity rule and the requirements
of section 1332 are served by denying supplemental jurisdiction only to
claims by original plaintiffs and to claims by additional parties who are
aligned in common interest with the original plaintiffs. This approach
fosters the goal of complete adjudication which would otherwise be
frustrated by the artificial division of subject matter jurisdiction between
state and federal courts.

180. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
181. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
182. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (West Supp. 1991).
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Strawbridge itself reserved the issue of how or whether the rule would
apply when there were "separate, distinct" interests.8 3 When interests
are joint, the additional party can easily be aligned; when interests are
several and permissive, there are policy grounds for relegating an intervenor to a state forum.'8 Many cases of intervention of right concern
a multi-polar dispute that is neither joint, common, nor easily severable.
Judicial efficiency and complete adjudication will be served in such cases
by supplemental jurisdiction.
The federal courts will continue to exercise much discretion over claims
in intervention, either by application of the rules of joinder, by interpretation of ambiguities in section 1367(b), or by relying on their authority
to decline supplemental jurisdiction under section 1367(c). Nonetheless,
it is to be hoped that section 1367 will be a cleansing wind that washes
away the haze of restrictive precedents that have unduly complicated an
already complex area of law.

183. Strawbridge, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 267-68.
184. Even in non-28 U.S.C. § 1332 cases, when supplemental jurisdiction exists over a plaintiff's
claims, there is judicial discretion to deny permissive intervention under rule 24(b).

